[79] in every kind of knowledge (…) two sharply distinct tendencies have made their appearance. The first, the tendency toward caution, toward factuality, toward faith in direct sensation and intuition, and away from everything smacking of ‘interpretation’, of the construction of mental sky-scrapers, is known, in the history of philosophy, sometimes as empiricism, but more frequently as realism. In its simpler and more naive forms, it looks upon reality as something like a child’s box of blocks. With these, children construct whatever edifices please their fancy. But, when their play is over, the nurse puts them all back again into their box, and there they are, what [80] indeed they always were, separate individual blocks, and nothing more. So David Hume, who represents the culmination of the tendency associated with the name of John Locke, reduces the reality sought in experience, to a number of quasi-atomic ‘simple ideas’. Like the child’s blocks, these are, for Hume, essentially separate. We can put them together, if we will: we can ‘associate’ them in our fancy, at our pleasure. But, when our imaginative play is over, along comes the relentless metaphysician and sweeps them up, and puts them back again into their box, ‘conjoined, but not connected’. Bertrand Russell, at the present day, declares that there are only two possible attitudes toward Hume’s arguments : to accept them, or to ignore them. Neo-realist logic applies to all philosophies the stern test of analysis into separate, hard-and-fast concepts, which may be related only in certain specified ways ; much as the child’s blocks can be juxtaposed only in the three spatial dimensions, in front or behind, above or below, to right or left. It must be admitted that realism, with its insistence upon caution and exactitude, represents one of the fundamental tendencies in philosophy, a tendency strong and active in us all.