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McLuhan and Aristotle 1 (first encounters)

There are “definite types of temperament” which are constant possibilities “in all times and places” and it is from these, as from a kind of birth, that human experience variously derives. Lodge himself saw three such primary types, not two, but he agreed that two of these were “the Idealist and the Realist”. Lodge thought that the central charge for ‘comparative’ philosophy was to recognize these possibilities in action and to weigh any and all assertions formed from them in light of how they might equally appear from the vantage of the ‘precluded’ ones. He found this contest of foundations (which McLuhan would later style an “ancient quarrel”) preeminently enacted in the dialogues of Plato.

From early on McLuhan rejected the idea that human types characterize only styles of thinking. Instead, he insisted, they must apply to the whole person or persons (in the case of social entities). Like the relatively concrete “literary or artistic expression” to which he assigned equal rights with philosophy, the word “temperament” is revealing with its implication of emotions. McLuhan was already emphasizing, this in 1934 as a 22 year-old, that a typology of human being must cover any sort of experience whatever including, as he would soon insist, ‘ordinary cognition’. It was around 1950 that he would come to the formulation of the point he maintained for the rest of his life. In a series of papers he would argue that art is not derived from our individual and social life but, rather, our individual and social life from art. An artwork ‘retrieves’ or ‘replays’ or ‘retraces’ the genesis of experience (objective genitive) which is originally ‘poetic’. As he put it in his 1969 Playboy Interview, the key insight concerns “the identity of the processes of cognition and creation”. But already in 1951 in ‘The Aesthetic Moment in Landscape Poetry’ he could put the point in this way: “this secret consists in nothing less than a fusion of the learning (ie, the perceptual in the sense of learning about the world before one) and the creative processes in (…) the (…) moment of (…) awareness. This peculiar fusion of the cognitive and the creative (is revealed in art) by an act of retracing the stages of apprehension”. (The bracketed specifications in the preceding sentences are editorial additions.) The types of human experience — what he would come in the course of the 1950s to call “media” — are not first of all philosophical or even artistic categories, but are the general poetics encoded in any and all experience (including in philosophy and art as special cases of it).