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McLuhan’s contributions

5. McLuhan saw with Harold Innis that the relativity of all human cognition could achieve demonstrable insights, even laws, without — necessarily without! — eventuating in some kind of matching or merging between the experiencing subject, individual or collective, and the investigated object. Achieved truth of this sort (and there is no other sort) is irremediably finite and always subject to future adjustment and revision, but is nonetheless true. Indeed, truth is possible on this basis alone! Such finite but truthful insight he called making as contrasted to matching or merging and this artefactual nature was one of the many parallels he perceived between the arts and sciences.

See ‘The Humanities in the Electronic Age’, 1961: “The technique of insight itself is (…) the means of abstracting oneself from the bias and consequence of one’s own culture. (…) Innis’ concern in the Bias of Communication is with the technique of the suspended judgement. That means, not the willingness to admit other points of view, but the technique of how not to have a point of view. This is identical with the problem facing physicists in correcting the bias of the instruments of research, and it draws attention to the fact that the historian, the poet, the critic, and the philosopher, now as always, face exactly the same situations as the scientist.”