Our conclusion then is that realism, idealism, and pragmatism remain fundamentally distinct [approaches to experience], and that the positions constructed by philosophers [reflecting and analyzing these distinctions] are of direct concern to educationists in the pursuit of their profession [along with everybody else in pursuit of their professions].
It is impossible to formulate what “realism, idealism, and pragmatism” are without deploying one of them in doing so. Hence they may variously be termed ‘approaches to experience’, ‘forms of reality’, ‘kinds of truth’, ‘sorts of hypotheses’, etc. This self-referential circularity is an essential aspect of the problem complex at stake here. McLuhan in his Nashe thesis: “In studying the history of dialectics and rhetoric, as, indeed, of grammar, it is unavoidable that one adopt the point of view of one of these arts; and the history of the trivium is largely a history of the rivalry among them for ascendancy.” (Classical Trivium, 41-42)